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Abstract: In industrial societies, women increasingly postpone motherhood. While men do 
not fear a loss of fertility with age, women face the biological boundary of menopause. The 
freezing of unfertilized eggs can overcome this biological barrier. Due to technical 
improvements in vitrification, so-called “social freezing” (SF) for healthy women is likely 
to develop into clinical routine. Controversial ethical debates focus on the risks of the 
technique for mother and child, the scope of reproductive autonomy, and the 
medicalization of reproduction. Some criticize the use of the technique in healthy women 
in general, while others support a legally defined maximum age for women at the time of 
an embryo transfer after oocyte cryopreservation. Since this represents a serious 
encroachment on the reproductive autonomy of the affected women, the reasons for and 
against must be carefully examined. We analyze arguments for and against SF from a 
gendered ethical perspective. We show that the risk of the cryopreservation of oocytes for 
mother and future child is minimal and that the autonomy of the women involved is not 
compromised. The negative ethical evaluation of postponed motherhood is partly due to a 
biased approach highlighting only the medical risks for the female body without 
recognizing the potential positive effects for the women involved. In critical accounts, age 
is associated in an undifferentiated way with morbidity and psychological instability and is 
thus used in a discriminatory way. We come to the conclusion that age as a predictor of 
risk in the debate about SF is, from an ethical point of view, an empty concept based on 
gender stereotypes and discriminatory connotations of aging. A ban on postponing 
motherhood via SF is not justified. 
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1. Introduction  
In most industrial societies, people postpone their decision to have children to later in life [1,2] 1. 
While it is unproblematic for men to still have a biological child at an advanced age, women face 
biological limits due to the time span of female fertility. These biological limits weigh even more 
heavily at a time of demographic change. Life expectancy is constantly increasing. Nowadays, an 
average European woman lives almost twice as long as a century ago [3,4]. It was long considered to 
be a woman’s fate not to be able to conceive and bear genetic children of her own from the age of 45. 
However, technological advancements in reproductive medicine make it possible to prolong this time 
span of fertility. Young women can have their eggs frozen in order to have them fertilized, and thus 
fulfill their desire to have a child, at a later point in time, if necessary even after menopause. 
The technique of egg freezing initially served to afford women receiving gonadotoxic therapy 2 an 
opportunity to fulfill their desire to have a child in spite of chemotherapy and toxic damage to their 
ovaries. However, this technique initially yielded low success rates due to the high water content in 
unfertilized eggs [5]. Now that the success rates have in the meantime been improved [6,7], 
practitioners of reproductive medicine are increasingly offering this option to fertile and healthy 
women as well. The use of this procedure in the case of fertile women who want to secure the option 
of having a child at a later time in life has been labelled “social freezing” (SF). What might be hailed 
as making strides toward gender equality has actually generated a widespread sense of unease. 
Criticism has been sparked by cases in which older women, some even over 60, have given birth to a 
child after an egg donation. Critics have voiced objections against the technique of SF as well on 
similar grounds. Some of them criticize the use of the technique in healthy women in general, while 
others support a legally defined maximum age for women at the time of an embryo transfer 3. For, in 
many countries, including Germany, there is not yet any legally binding age limit for the use of this 
technique. In Denmark, by contrast, there is a direct prohibition on technically assisted reproduction 
for women of 45 and older ([8], No. 923 2006, chap. 2, § 6). The law stipulates a maximum storage 
period for frozen eggs of five years ([8], chap. 3, § 15). 
This represents a serious encroachment on the reproductive autonomy of the affected women. The 
reasons for and against a legally specified age limit for egg-cell transfer for the purpose of bringing 
                                                 
1  This research was funded by VolkswagenStiftung, Germany, as part of the research group “Autonomy and Trust in 
Modern Medicine”. 
2  Several conditions such as cancer or autoimmune diseases require gonadotoxic therapy. Another reason for opting for 
SF can be the legal situation in the respective country, e.g., if embryo cryopreservation is prohibited by law as in Italy 
(e.g., by the Italian law on medically assisted reproduction (Law 40/2004)). 
3  In 2011, we conducted a questionnaire survey “On the ethical aspects of the cryopreservation of unfertilized oocytes” 
among fertility physicians. 51% of respondents were in favor of a legal regulation of “social freezing”. Of the 51% who 
spoke out in favor of legal regulation, a majority (55%) chose “maximum age at the time of implantation” as the matter 
to be regulated. This means that 28% of all of those we surveyed were in favor of an age limit for “social freezing”.  
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about a pregnancy must therefore be carefully examined. Frequently cited arguments refer to the safety 
of the procedure for the woman and the child to be born. The benefits and risks of SF for the child to 
be born as well as for the woman, should she become pregnant at an advanced age, are discussed. 
Another point of discussion is the woman’s autonomy. Are women able to make an autonomous 
decision in favor of SF, or are they exposed to social pressures that undermine their freedom? Many 
critical authors adopt a gender perspective in this connection—that is, they also consider SF under the 
aspect of the social position of women in society and criticize implicit and explicit mechanisms of 
oppression. They arrive at the seemingly paradoxical conclusion that women’s emancipation is 
promoted by placing restrictions on the individual freedom to avail of SF. The aim of our paper is to 
examine the cogency of this line of argument.  
The SF technique is made possible by the long-term cryopreservation of oocytes. Following 
hormone stimulation, eggs are retrieved from young women, frozen, and stored in liquid nitrogen. 
Additional protective substances, so-called cryoprotectants, are used to prevent freezing damage. The 
freezing methods currently in use, slow freezing and vitrification 4, differ in the speed at which the 
temperature is lowered and in the amounts and kind of cryoprotectants used. After thawing, 
fertilization can occur with the aid of in vitro fertilization (IVF) via the intracytoplasmic injection of 
sperm into the egg (ICSI). Survival and implantation rates of the once frozen eggs after thawing and 
insemination show that these techniques are effective and successful freezing procedures [9–13]. Egg 
cells can be frozen in a fertilized state (inseminated oocyte) or an unfertilized state (mature oocyte 5). 
Embryos can be cryopreserved as well. Unless otherwise specified, in what follows we use the terms 
oocyte, egg, or egg cell to refer to the freezing of unfertilized mature oocytes. 
2. Arguments and Criticism 
2.1. Arguments over Benefits and Risks 
2.1.1. Risks of Egg Retrieval and Cryopreservation Techniques 
The assessment of the risks of the technique plays a central role in the discussion over “social 
freezing”. Karey Harwood criticizes the fact that there are insufficient data on the safety of the 
procedure. Others point out that the long-term effects of egg retrieval for women cannot be estimated 
and that risk-benefit analyses are not possible [15,16]. In so arguing, they imply that it is scarcely 
possible to make assertions about the risks associated with the procedure of “social freezing”. 
However, this does not correspond to the data available, as we will show in what follows.  
Nowadays, hormonal stimulation with ensuing egg collection prior to the freezing process can be 
conducted with a very low risk of less than one percent for complications such as bleeding or ovarian 
                                                 
4  Slow freezing is a freezing process in which cells are cooled at a rate of 1 °C/1.8 °F per minute. Vitrification requires a 
rapid reduction in temperature. During the process, fluid is withdrawn from the cell by cryoprotectants. The cell content 
and the remainder of the cell fluid go into a firm viscous aggregate state. This process requires larger amounts  
of cryoprotectants. 
5  Immature eggs can likewise be frozen and subsequently ripen in vitro. Research is currently being conducted on this 
method. To date, convincing results are yet to be achieved (e.g., [14]). 
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hyperstimulation syndrome (OHSS) [17]. The risks directly associated with egg retrieval are very 
slight. According to the current state of science, there is only a slight risk of damage to the woman’s 
body through egg retrieval and the associated preparation.  
Further sources of concern regarding the safety of the process are freezing damage and the toxicity 
of cryoprotective agents (CPA). Potentially affected by freezing damage are, in particular, the spindle 
apparatus and the associated arrangement of chromosomes [18,19]. However, the spindle apparatus 
recovers after thawing and seems to do so without alterations in >80% of the cases [18,20]. The older 
the woman is at the time the cells are frozen, however, the greater the damage to the spindle apparatus 
after thawing [18,21]. Although higher concentrations of cryoprotectants are used in vitrification than 
in slow freezing procedures, vitrification causes less damage to the oocytes. Better rates of oocyte 
development and survival are achieved than in the case of slow freezing procedures by oocyte 
vitrification [9,22]. Several studies reported no statistically significant differences in fertilization and 
implantation rates between oocyte vitrification and fresh oocyte insemination cycles [6,7,13,23,24]. 
Some studies showed lower fertilization rates after vitrification of oocytes (e.g., [25]).  
The toxicity of cryoprotectant substances is a complex issue, given the fact that not only 
concentration but also temperature and time of exposure are crucial for resulting toxicity for the cells [26]. 
While the toxicity of cryoprotectants after egg vitrification has been intensively studied in mammalian 
oocytes, studies on human eggs are scarce [27]. Recent analyses of the ultrastructure of human oocytes 
seem to indicate that the damage caused by freezing procedures and cryoprotectants is low 6 and that 
the overall ultrastructural appearance of mature oocytes is good [27]. However, it has to be stated that 
this study design gives limited information about the possible loss of function and DNA damage. 
Recent studies focus on morphological and functional analysis of the egg and the resulting embryo. 
Forman et al. studied possible DNA damage in embryos after the vitrification of oocytes and found no 
increased risk of embryonic aneuploidy [25]. Mitochondrial and microtubular functioning differed 
depending on the combination of CPA used [28]. Further research is needed in order to minimize 
damage [9]. The current state of research suggests that the toxicity of freezing substances is not 
alarming, assuming that the optimal substances are used in the optimal concentrations [28–30]. There 
is a possibility of the material becoming contaminated during storage in liquid nitrogen. However, 
such an event has not yet been described in the case of human oocytes or embryos ([27], p. 38). 
All cryoprotectants have been used for some time in medicine and many are used in slow freezing 
procedures. They are used in lower concentrations but for a longer period of time due to slower 
cooling processes, so that in the end a similar concentration of cryoprotectants in the oocyte is 
achieved [22,26]. The woman’s age at the time the cells are frozen seems to have the greatest influence 
on the harmful effects of cryoprotectants in the vitrification process [18,21]. The risk of contamination 
during storage is slight [31]. 
A primary focus of concern is the impacts of the freezing procedure on the child. The American 
Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) warns in two separate communiqués about the 
unforeseeable risks of chromosomal abnormalities and malformations of the child as a result of the 
                                                 
6  Alterations of the cell relate to a vacuolization of the cytoplasm and a hardening of the zona pellucida (the surrounding 
membrane of the cytoplasm) [27]. 
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vitrification of oocytes [32,33]. According to currently available data, however, there is little reason to 
speak of alarmingly high risks of this kind [34–37]. A review of the outcome of children born 
following the vitrification of eggs does not describe any increased rates for chromosomal abnormalities 
or malformations [34]. In a meta-analysis of over 900 children born after vitrification and slow 
freezing processes, the malformation rate is 1.3% [36]; in another study involving over 200 neonates 
not included in the meta-analysis by Noyes, the rate is 2.5% [37]. This means that the results are all 
within the scope of the malformation rate in the case of spontaneous births, which is around 3% [38]. 
Only one study by Belva et al. describes a rate of malformations in the group of cryopreserved 
embryos (6.4%, N = 937) that is twice as high as the control group (3.2%, N = 5719) [39]. 
There is an urgent need of further prospective case control studies with comparable values and a 
high number of cases in the comparison and control groups. However, recent studies by no means 
support alarming inferences concerning unforeseeable risks. On the contrary, the current state of 
research seems to confirm that the events feared by the ASRM are not empirically confirmable. 
Notably, in a recent guideline on the cryopreservation of oocytes, the ASRM concludes that the 
procedure is no longer experimental and that the data on outcomes can now be considered fairly 
satisfactory [40]. 
2.1.2. Risks of a Late Pregnancy 
The effects of wanting to fulfill one’s desire for a child also later in life are discussed under the 
topic of late motherhood 7. Medical, psychological, demographic, and moral perspectives are brought 
to bear on these effects. In what follows, we will refer only to the ethically relevant arguments in the 
discussion about SF.  
Late motherhood is not a clearly defined concept. Medically speaking, pregnancies of women of 35 
and older are considered to be high-risk pregnancies ([41], p. 53). It is unclear whether pregnancies 
after menopause are also counted among late pregnancies or whether they form a separate complex. 
This also depends on whether specific risks can be identified that only apply to the group of 
postmenopausal pregnancies. Late motherhood involves higher risks (e.g., [42–48]). According to 
Kenny et al., the risks increase continually with increasing age, so that it cannot be assumed that there 
is an exponential increase in risk beyond a certain age 8 [46]. In most studies on late pregnancies, the 
risk factors of high blood pressure, gestational diabetes, and preeclampsia are sharply elevated and 
generally occur in between 10 and 20% of cases (e.g., [49]). There are also studies that show a strongly 
increased rate of cesarean section in women aged 40 and older [50–52]. The chief risks for the 
newborn child are prematurity and low birth weight [47]. High maternal age is identified as an 
independent and direct risk factor for complications during pregnancy [42,47]. According to Sauer, 
                                                 
7  The effects should actually be dealt with under the topic of late parenthood. Since SF relates to women and the criticism 
is based on aspects of late motherhood, we concentrate on these points of criticism. Beyond this, however, there is need 
of a critical discussion from the perspective of gender.  
8  This point is important because it complicates the stipulation of a specific upper age limit. Another important aspect to 
be mentioned is that the differing age categories and age ranges within medical studies as well as the probably differing 
risks after natural conception, egg donation or SF make a clear analysis of the risks involved in late pregnancy difficult.  
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however, it is questionable whether there is a linear relationship between age and elevated risk: “It is 
often difficult to determine if the observed increase is due to age alone or to other confounding 
variables such as pre-existing disease, obesity, parity and socio-economic factors” [53]. The specific 
reason frequently cited for regarding age as an independent risk factor is the increase in the frequency 
of stillbirths with higher maternal age [54–57]. It is true that, after correcting for potential confounders 
such as pre-existing conditions, the probability of a stillbirth in women of 40 and older compared to 
women between 35 and 39 rises from 0.9%–1.5% (see the diagram in [54]). In a systematic review on 
stillbirth and maternal age, the authors arrive at a similar conclusion, namely that a stillbirth occurs in 
about 1% of cases of older women in developed countries [56]. These figures point to a statistically 
significant, but by no means dramatic increase. The underlying pre-existing conditions as well as 
general physical health, possibly influenced by excessive nicotine use or obesity, seem to be more 
significant predictors of complications in pregnancy than chronological age. What is more, it is 
striking that protective factors are rarely mentioned in the discussion of late pregnancy. High  
socio-economic status is correlated with a significant reduction in the risk of preterm births in the case 
of older women ([58], p. 42). Only holistic studies, such as those that already exist on age mortality, 
could help to distinguish more precisely the effects of specific risk factors and the underlying  
causes ([58], p. 39). Studies on the risks of higher paternal age for pregnancy and childbirth are 
similarly underrepresented in medical research. A PubMed search conducted in January 2014 with the 
keyword “late motherhood” yielded 109 results as compared to 17 results for the keyword “late 
fatherhood” 9. These partial results create the false impression that late pregnancy is an event that can 
be positively or negatively influenced by the woman alone, focused on the age of the woman and 
disconnected from socio-economic and psychological factors.  
The debate over SF also addresses the ability of late mothers to cope with physical and 
psychological stress. Shkedi-Rafid and Hashiloni-Dolev ask: “will the mother be able to fulfil her 
maternal role as the years go by? Will she not be less energetic than a young mother?” [59]. Whether 
older parents are mentally and physically able to take care of their child is also discussed in the debate 
over postmenopausal egg donation (e.g., [60–62]). Some authors question the psychological stability 
of older mothers [60]. Physical ailments, as well as the feeling of frailty, increase with age. 
Nevertheless, older mothers have many resources, such as partnership and economic security that 
constitute a favorable living situation for late motherhood [63]. Age also has positive effects on 
parenthood. Children of older mothers (older than 35 years) are more likely to be born into a stable 
family environment. The families are often financially secure and partners are more likely to be 
involved in the care and upbringing of the child [64]. A study on late motherhood and parental stress 
showed that levels of stress were even lower in the group of women over 50 than in the group of  
40-year-olds [65]. Goold and Savulescu thus conclude that “there are reasons to think it is actually 
better for women to have children later in life” ([66], p. 54) Considering the risks of parenthood only 
                                                 
9  PubMed search on 22 January 2014. Other search combinations ([advanced age], [postponed] AND [motherhood], 
[advanced age], [postponed] AND [fatherhood]) yielded similar proportions among the results, albeit at a very low 
number of articles (max. 7). MeSH terms on this topic could not be identified.  
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with regard to general physical condition seems one-dimensional and does not do justice to the variety 
of resources that can actually have a positive influence on parenthood.  
2.1.3. Benefits of SF 
Critics of SF not only invoke the risks of the technology but also doubt its usefulness both for 
individual women and for women as such. Karey Harwood argues that it is to be feared that eggs 
would undergo further aging due to the freezing process and that, as a consequence, one cannot predict 
what birth rates will be achieved with the technique, especially when eggs are collected from women 
over the age of 35. She speaks in this context of a potential twofold disadvantage that women would 
risk if they were to have their egg cells frozen, namely, the freezing of eggs at a time of life when the 
quality of these cells is poorer, and the further loss in quality due to the process of freezing and 
thawing [67]. Other authors likewise point out that the success of the technique cannot be promised 
with certainty since even IVF without SF leads to conception and the birth of a child only in a 
maximum of 30% of cases [16]. Finally, there are doubts concerning the benefits for women as such. It 
is argued that the technique entices women to postpone their desire to reproduce to an older age, but 
one at which, statistically speaking, the probability of becoming pregnant declines sharply [59]. 
Moreover, the technical solution is inadequate, it is argued, since it is a social problem when healthy 
young women do not feel in a position to have a child [65]. These women should be afforded greater 
opportunities to reconcile family and career, and discrimination against women of childbearing age 
should be combatted.  
Against these arguments it must be objected that it has not been possible to demonstrate cell aging 
or damage caused by the length of storage in the case of vitrified embryos [68]. On the contrary, the 
earlier an egg is frozen, the lower the risks of aneuploidy or chromosomal aberrations 10 [69,70]. The 
reproduction physicians Sauer, Paulson, and Lobo note: “the decreasing fecundity normally seen in 
older women is primarily due to ovarian rather than uterine factors” [53]. Thus, reproductive success 
depends on the age of the egg, not on the age of the uterus. Even if studies of age effects on the uterine 
function show a decreasing uterine capacity to adopt to and manage the gestational changes that are 
mostly explained by an impaired myometrial function and impaired decidual and placental 
development at later age, it remains unclear how severe these decreases are [71]. The British medical 
scientists Nelson, Telfer, and Anderson also describe probable compensatory mechanisms of uterine 
aging that consist of higher placental weight in older women compared to younger women [71]. The 
examples of pregnancies through egg donation in women over 50 show that uterine incompetence does 
not impede pregnancies with healthy outcomes for woman and child [52,72,73].  
Were the freezing of eggs to be offered to women over 35, the success rates would indeed suffer as 
a result. Harwood highlights this important fact with her critique of the twofold disadvantage. 
However, the actual target group for SF is younger women. The fact that the average age of women 
opting for SF is currently 38 is not evidence that poor success rates are achieved with the procedure in 
principle, but is instead an argument for improved social information and education concerning the 
                                                 
10  Aneuploidy means that the number of chromosomes in a cell deviates from the usual distribution of chromosomes. 
Chromosomal aberration refers to a change in the structure of the chromosome due to mutated, missing, or extra DNA. 
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procedure [74]. Moreover, most women—assuming that they have been appropriately informed about 
the procedure—will not be so naïve as to consider a future pregnancy as guaranteed. This is also the 
assessment of the fertility physicians Eli Rybak and Harry Lieman: “We feel that there is no basis to 
assume patients cannot understand that elective oocyte cryopreservation increases, but does not 
guarantee, their chance of autologous procreation” [75]. 
Even today, there is no guarantee of becoming pregnant either by natural means or by means of 
reproductive medical techniques. The natural conception rate per cycle among young women is 
between 20 and 25%. Therefore, it is extremely unlikely that women will rely entirely on the success 
of SF and subsequent transfer. Even lower success rates would not speak against a technique. The low 
rate of conception following IVF in some cases is well known and has not deterred women in the 
meantime, for the past 30 years, from availing of this technology 11. Approximately the same success 
rates apply to IVF cycles with fresh oocytes and with oocytes thawed after vitrification, as studies  
show [6,7,13]. Admittedly, it must be borne in mind here that an existing infertility is treated in the 
case of IVF without SF, whereas in the case of IVF following SF a woman who is in principle fertile is 
postponing a pregnancy to a more advanced age. Because of the IVF that then becomes necessary, she 
is less likely to become pregnant than by natural means at a younger age. However, it does not 
necessarily follow from the fact that women have their eggs frozen as a precaution that they will 
refrain entirely from having a child at a younger age. On the contrary, it is conceivable that women 
will keep other options open in addition to SF, presumably depending on a range of other factors that 
can be influenced but not predicted. These include, for example, whether they meet a suitable partner 
or whether their job situation becomes more stable. Finally, the assertion that SF is a technical  
pseudo-solution to a social problem rests on two questionable premises. First, it presupposes that the 
availability of SF will entail that other measures to promote the compatibility of career and family will 
be restricted or fail to be taken altogether. It is hard to render such a linkage plausible. Even when 
women have children later in life, they will still need structural support to combine their job and 
childcare. Besides, as gender roles change, men will claim a better compatibility of job and family as 
well. Those who assert that SF is a technical pseudo-solution to a social problem presuppose that, in a 
society in which genuine equality had been realized, all women would want to have their children at a 
young age. However, this is not plausible either, since presumably even under such optimal conditions 
some women—as now already many men—would want to postpone having children to a time when 
they have already made important career moves or their life situation seems compatible with starting a 
family. Below we will show in addition that reproduction at a younger age instead of at a relatively 
advanced age is not invariably better for health reasons, either for the woman or for the child. Thus, the 
critics of SF cannot bring a compelling argument against the utility of the technique.  
  
                                                 
11  Success rates of IVF depend mostly upon the age of the woman at the time of hormonal stimulation and/or egg retrieval. 
The quality of the egg decreases significantly with increasing age [68,69]. For 2012, the HFEA reports a live birth rate 
per IVF cycle (a transferred fresh embryo) between 41.5% for women aged 18–34 and 3.4% for women aged 45 and 
older ([76], p. 26). 
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2.2. Autonomy 
Women’s autonomy is a frequently cited argument in the discussion. Proponents of SF regard 
respect for autonomous decisions as a weighty moral reason in support of the procedure [77,78]. 
Critics, by contrast, doubt whether the decision is self-determined. The criticism is put forward in two 
different forms. Authors either appeal to relational approaches to autonomy and thus situate the 
motives for opting for SF within a wider social context, or they evaluate the individual decision 
directly. In what follows, we address the two lines of argument in turn.  
An essential point of reference of the notion of relational autonomy is that people should be 
perceived in their social context. Social interactions shape the self-understanding and identity of 
persons. Political, cultural, and sociocultural influences can either enable or restrict autonomy. This 
influence should be analyzed and taken into account in conceptions of autonomy. Based on these 
considerations, Carolyn McLeod and Susan Sherwin derive a political responsibility to promote 
change at the social level: “Insofar as oppression has reduced or undermined an agent’s ability to act 
autonomously in various contexts, relational autonomy seeks politically aware solutions that endeavor 
to change social conditions and not just expand the options offered to agents” ([66], p. 260). Not a few 
critics of SF are alert to the danger of only expanding options without changing social conditions. Shiri 
Shkedi-Rafid and Yael Hashiloni-Dolev point out that social pressures would constrain women to 
decide in favor of SF. The social pressure to compete on the labor market, they argue, now already 
compels many women to put their careers before the fulfillment of their desire to have children. The 
widespread use of the vitrification of oocytes would increase the pressure on women to postpone their 
desire to have children and thus reduce the likelihood of their fulfilling it [59].  
Were employers and government to attach less importance to the compatibility of occupation and 
family as a result, these would in fact be disturbing developments. However, this trend is, as already 
described above, unlikely. The responsibility of society to facilitate different life plans is not less as a 
result. The situation in the labor market is in any case not necessarily the only reason why women opt 
for SF. Women could also decide to have a child later in life for reasons that have nothing to do with 
this, for example, because they have a longer life expectancy or because their lives have become 
centered in a particular place only later in life. Proponents of a relational concept of autonomy should 
devote just as much attention to the social pressures on women to have a child early in life. The option 
to have children later in life is instead an opportunity to reflect upon the gendered role of woman and 
mother and thus to emancipate oneself from social constraints. At any rate, the relationship between 
social constraint and the use of SF is not as straightforward as Harwood or Shkedi-Rafid and 
Hashiloni-Dolev imagine.  
Angel Petropanagos also appeals to the concept of relational autonomy. She asks whether the 
woman’s decision in favor of SF can be regarded as free at all and whether it is not rather a function of 
a complex system of personal, social, and political factors. “A relational approach to autonomy 
requires one to understand the personal, social and political factors that shape women’s reproductive 
choice” [79]. A range of factors not open to influence such as the lack of a suitable partner and 
diminishing fecundity, she argues, leave women with little or no choice but to secure their fertility for 
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a later date. The decision in favor of SF, therefore, is not a genuine reproductive “choice” 12. 
Petropanagos’s analysis is important because it highlights the fact that planned life contents can often 
be thwarted by unexpected events and are often shaped by social and political factors. However, even 
if this is undoubtedly true, the individual decision may very well be self-determined. We have to 
consider the complexity of differentiating between ‘circumstance’ and ‘choice’. What is considered to 
be an either/or category in theory will often overlap in people’s own description of their childlessness [81]. 
Circumstances such as a suitable partnership, career options, friends, and other fulfilling interests are 
not only factors independent of the individual’s choice or influence, but may in fact be part of the 
individual’s own choices. Several studies indicate that the proportion of women who deliberately 
remain childless has increased, even if the overall percentage of these women is small [81,82]. 
Although motherhood is in fact still very strongly socially normalized [83], the view of not having a 
choice at all seems rather implausible in the light of the increasing diversity of life and family designs. 
Therefore, Petropanagos is in danger of regarding women as playthings of their circumstances and 
hence of denying them the capacity to make an autonomous decision.  
Some authors also take a critical view of the individual motivation of the affected women. Some 
critics of SF address the reasons that could lead to a decision in favor of SF. In doing so, they ascribe 
specific psychological behavioral patterns to women. Reasons for considering SF would be, for 
example, the “evasion of a decision” ([16], p. 36) or the “repression of finitude, frustration, and 
inability to cope with the demands of life” ([84], pp. 246–47). Thus, assuming that women are not 
pressed into making their decision by social constraints (so that they cannot be attributed any 
responsibility for their decision), then they opt for SF for the “wrong reasons”. By contrast, Bittner, 
Müller, and Bozzaro advocate other values, such as fulfilling one’s desire to have children as early as 
possible, natural reproduction, according priority to one’s desire to have children over other contents 
of life, or the correlation of certain life events with certain phases of life. People who do not decide in 
accordance with this scale of values, they argue, act for the wrong reasons or have not adequately 
confronted their desire to have children. However, this involves a confusion of autonomy with 
orthonomy–orthonomy meaning that, for the sake of good governance, individuals have to comply 
with common values irrespective of their self-determined choice. The philosopher Paul Benson 
criticizes such strongly substantive concepts of autonomy because “they conflate the power to take 
ownership of one’s action with something quite different, the power to get things right, or the ability to 
adopt the preferences or values one ought to have” ([85], p. 132). Some values may appear correct to 
certain people as personal criteria and justify why they would like to have a baby sooner. However, 
                                                 
12  In the article cited, Angel Petropanagos analyzes whether there is a moral difference between disease-related egg 
freezing and age-related egg freezing (which we refer to here as SF). In her doctoral thesis, she gives a comprehensive 
moral analysis of SF. She concludes that an upper age limit for access to reproductive technologies is morally 
appropriate because women would otherwise be in danger of “ageist discrimination by inclusion”, meaning that women 
would feel under pressure to bear a child even later in life ([80], p. 143). The reasons for an upper age limit are possible 
harms to the woman, the resulting offspring, and others in society, especially other women ([80], p. 142). She also 
doubts that the decision of older women to opt for risky procedures of reproductive technologies is an autonomous 
choice of their own. She mentions internalized oppressive social norms, pronatalist and ageist values in particular, as 
the main reasons for this lack of autonomy ([80], pp. 146, 165). 
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these values definitely cannot serve as criteria for all people who want to have children, for the “right” 
kind of autonomy, or even for the ethical evaluation of a procedure in reproductive medicine. Bittner, 
Müller, and Bozzaro implicitly encourage a stereotypical conception of women. This represents 
women as agents who respond incompetently, evasively, and in emotionally immature ways to their 
life situation. The woman is perceived as a counterpart to the rationally planning and less emotional 
man, which corresponds to the classical stereotypes of male and female behavior ([83], pp. 16–20). 
However, the authors provide no evidence that this is how women actually reach the decision to freeze 
their oocytes. 
Moreover, Bittner and Müller complain that women would initially postpone their desire to have 
children, and later, having lived a fulfilled life, would still have a child under the “solipsistic 
paradigm” ([16], p. 39): “It might seem implausible if a woman of 60 suddenly wants to integrate 
children into her life on the grounds that only a life with children is fulfilled and happy. If you have led 
your life for 60 years against the backdrop of a ‘solipsistic paradigm’, you have to ask yourself why 
this should change with 60—and how authentic such a change is within the context of a coherent life.” 
This conception rests on strong assumptions: (1) that the conduct of life is coherent; and (2) that it 
is fundamentally morally questionable to postpone the desire to have children to later in life. That the 
first assumption is not necessarily true was already mentioned in the previous section. One’s life plan 
does not invariably correspond with the actual course of life. Unforeseen events and political or 
economic constraints can alter the actually envisaged plan. The assumption that life events should be 
correlated with specific phases of life is primarily a piece of descriptive knowledge. One cannot make 
direct normative inferences from this finding that could count as moral objections against late 
motherhood. The assumption of a solipsistic lifestyle also involves stereotypical images of women. In 
a dichotomous representation of women, the warm, altruistic, considerate mother is contrasted with the 
calculating, egoistic career woman who represses her desire to have children. However, other 
inferences can be drawn from a survey of 1049 women on their motivations for opting for or against 
SF [86]. Women who considered SF differ from those who rejected the procedure neither in education, 
occupation, nor income bracket. This refutes the assumption that women would want to take advantage 
of SF for egoistic or career-oriented reasons. A strong desire to have children and the acceptance of 
becoming pregnant even at a more advanced age are cited as the most important factors influencing a 
potential decision to avail of the procedure [86]. In this respect, the image of the career-driven woman 
seems to be a prejudice based on the underlying assumption that women with career ambitions could 
not have any desire to have children or only one that is “distorted”. This way of viewing things 
involves the danger of degrading the desire to have children of such women and of stigmatizing those 
who nevertheless give expression to this desire. Men accommodate themselves to the labor market and 
to concepts of professional development just as much by having children later in life. Moreover, men 
postpone their desire for children to an even later time in life than women [87]. Through a one-sided 
view, women’s behavior is pathologized instead of being regarded as a constructive response to 
transformation processes at all levels of society.  
It follows from the foregoing remarks that the assumption that women decide to have their  
eggs frozen out of sheer compulsion or out of a lack of self-determination and self-reflection is 
implausible, although it must be acknowledged that social and economic circumstances in particular 
influence the decision.  
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3. Conclusions 
In our paper, we have examined whether it is ethically justified to prohibit SF in principle, or at 
least for women above a certain age limit. We have critically examined empirical data and ethical 
arguments for and against SF. We inquired into the risk and benefits of the technique for the mother 
and the child. We also addressed whether women’s capacity for self-determination is compromised by 
social factors and whether SF is the wrong technological answer to what is in fact a social problem. 
With regard to SF, is it true that, as Karey Harwood holds, “technological solutions to social problems 
are inadequate and often result in the further oppression of disadvantaged groups” [67]? 
Our study has shown that existing data indicate that the process does not entail any significant 
increase in the risk of a malformation in the child. It also follows from our evaluation that even though 
the risk of morbidity and mortality in a later pregnancy is increased for the woman, the level of 
interindividual differences is large. However, further follow-up studies are needed. Yet, as Mertes and 
Pennings rightly summarize, the procedure of SF itself does not represent a significant danger. The 
danger is instead that women learn too late of its existence and that as a result their eggs are already 
aged at the time of freezing [74]. Instead, as Goold and Savulescu stress, the positive aspects of late 
motherhood like equal participation by women in employment, more time to choose a partner, better 
financial opportunities for the child and a reduction of genetic risks have to be taken into account [78].  
Against the self-determined decision of women in favor of SF, it is argued that women are pressed 
into making the decision by social conditions and hence are not in a position to decide autonomously. 
However, even if social expectations attached to the woman’s role play a contributory role in the 
decision to opt for SF, this is not sufficient to justify a paternalistic prohibition of the technology. 
Reproductive decisions are not generally taken in a vacuum, but are specifically characterized by the 
fact that they situate the person concerned in a social context shaped by traditions and expectations. 
This holds true for women and men alike. The resulting social pressure should not be counteracted by 
restricting the scope for making decisions. Instead, the decision for or against this technique should be 
facilitated through information. Anyone who asserts that this technique unnecessarily medicalizes 
reproduction would have to explain what is intrinsically bad about availing of SF. For the points of 
criticism adduced in this context concerning elevated risk or meagre utility are not so emphatic  
that they alone could justify a general prohibition. In a pervasively technologized world, the ideal of 
natural reproduction can count at best as a personal preference, but not as a moral principle valid for 
everyone ([88], p. 146). 
Critics of SF have argued further that women would postpone having children for selfish reasons 
and that postponing childbirth represses the fact of the finitude of human life [16,85]. However, this is 
a sweeping judgment associated with a stereotypical denigration of women’s motives. According to 
empirical findings, women who fulfill their desire to have children at a relatively advanced age are not 
a homogeneous group and act on different motives. Though, even an egoistic decision is not per se 
reprehensible on ethical grounds as long others are not harmed as a result. The desire to procreate and 
to have a biological child of one’s own is a potentially important element of individual conceptions of 
life and should be recognized as such.  
Thus far, therefore, no cogent arguments have been put forward for a fundamental prohibition of 
SF. So, are there sufficient reasons for a legally stipulated limit on the age of the woman at the time of 
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the implantation of the embryo in order to prevent women from using this technique at an advanced 
age? Late pregnancy is in fact associated with increased risks for the woman. However, these vary 
between individuals and are not generally higher than in the case of other medical interventions in 
which people are considered to be capable of making an informed decision, such as a sterilization 
operation. Another reason to limit the age of women would be the risk for the child to be orphaned at a 
young age [59–61]. This argument from the debate about postmenopausal motherhood has some  
merit ([89], p. 33). However, as Goold puts it: “If we really thought that having one older parent was 
problematic, ageing men conceiving children with younger women would have received greater 
censure” ([89], p. 34). Age limits for the reproduction of either men or women should comply with the 
requirements of justice and reproductive equality. For both men and women, conditions like having a 
younger partner should be taken into account. This would encourage a case-by-case decision rather 
than a fixed age limit as Goold in fact proposes ([89], p. 34). 
In the debate over late motherhood, a particularly critical view is taken of the risks for the woman 
and the child. Comparable risks for the child that may result from the advanced age of the father at the 
time of conception, by contrast, seldom receive mention (e.g., [90,91]) and at any rate are not grounds 
for a prohibition on late fatherhood. In any case, the proven protective and generally positive aspects 
of late parenthood should not be overlooked. For little can be deduced from chronological age alone 
concerning a person’s physical and psychological well-being. In fact, disease, physical fitness, social 
networking, stable partnership, and life situation play a crucial role in the incidence of complications. 
Instead, however, when it comes to late motherhood, age is associated in critical accounts in an 
undifferentiated way with morbidity and psychological instability and is thus used in a discriminatory 
way. A straightforward medical and ethical evaluation of late motherhood that takes a homogeneous 
group of “old women” as its point of departure does not do justice to individual variations in life 
situations. In this respect, age as a predictor of risk in the debate about SF is, from an ethical point of 
view, an empty concept based on gender stereotypes and discriminatory connotations of aging. 
Therefore, legal limits for the age of implantation of embryos following oocyte cryopreservation 
should not be stipulated either.  
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